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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
perspective, and the objectives of the Federal Power Act, as a whole, be
achieved. 30
The Commission's decision correctly resolved the conflict between
priority and preference. Because of its recognition that the priority
created by section 5 of the act must be paramount, the usefulness of the
preference clause has been severely limited. The preference given public
agencies will not be applicable unless public and private producers hap-
pen to apply simultaneously for a preliminary permit, or a license for
which no permit has been issued.
BRUCE L. ENNIS.
DIVORCE-RECRIMINATION Is No LONGER AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE-A
DECREE OF DIVORCE MAY BE AWARDED TO BOTH PARTIES IN CERTAIN SITUA-
TION.-Plaintiff wife commenced an action in district court for separate
maintenance. Defendant husband cross-claimed for a divorce. Plaintiff's
complaint was amended to seek an absolute divorce. The trial court
granted a decree of divorce to each party and alimony and support to
the wife. On appeal by the wife to the Montana Supreme Court,1 held,
affirmed. The doctrine of recrimination, as established by Montana
statute, is not an inflexible rule to be mechanically applied. Where both
parties to a divorce action have established grounds for divorce and the
trial court finds that the legitimate objects of marriage have been de-
stroyed, the court may, in its discretion, award a divorce to both parties.
Burns v. Burns, 400 P.2d 642 (Mont. 1965).
Montana has dramatically reversed its position on the strongly
criticized doctrine of absolute recrimination, 2 and has become one of the
few jurisdictions to adopt the double divorce. 3 The following discus-
sion is an analysis of the legal rules and reasons employed in those cases
in which both spouses have established a cause of action for divorce.
3Petitions to review and set aside the Federal Power Commission order licensing
PNPC to build High Mountain Sheep were entered in June, 1964, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Petitions were filed
separately by WPPSS, the Washington State Department of Conservation, and the
Secretary of the Interior through the U. S. Attorney General. All three argued that
the Federal Power Commission erred in matters of law and fact, and all sought
remand of the case to the Federal Power Commission-the first two with court
orders in favor of WPPSS's application, and the last in favor of federal development.
'The appeal was based on two grounds: that the lower court's award of alimony was
inadequate, and that the court erred in granting a double divorce. Instant case at 643.
'The instant decision was anticipated in Bissel v. Bissel. 129 Mont. 187, 284 P.2d 264
(1955), where the court, in a lengthy discussion of recrimination, gave approval by
way of dictum to cases which abandoned strict application of the doctrine in other
jurisdictions.
'E.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952); Flagg v. Flagg,
192 Wash. 679, 74 P.2d 189 (1937); Simmons v. Simmons, 122 Fla. 325, 165 So. 45
(1936); Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952); Barber v. Barber, 28 Tenn.
App. 559, 192 S.W.2d 79 (1945).
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ABSOLUTE RECRIMINATION
Analogous to the doctrine of contributory negligence in tort actions,
absolute recrimination renders divorce impossible when each spouse is
guilty of misconduct serious enough to give the other a cause of action for
divorce. 4 Recrimination first appeared in the Mosaic Code, 5 and was
later assimilated into Roman canon law. The chief purpose of the doctrine
was the protection of the property rights of the wife where both spouses
had been guilty of adultery." Lord Stowell, sitting in an ecclesiastical
court, was the first to apply recrimination in EnglandT Later English
courts realized the consequences of inflexible application of the doctrine
but were reluctant to overrule such an established principle. A remedy
was found in the Matrimonial Causes Act' and its amendments, 9 which
transferred divorce jurisdiction to the common law courts and allowed
the judges discretion in granting a divorce w;here both parties were guilty
of misconduct. American courts applied the doctrine as a matter of
course, and today some form of recrimination is found in almost every
jurisdiction.' °
Recrimination has been justified on a number of legal principles.
Most frequently used is the doctrine of "unclean hands"--the equitable
principle that one who is guilty of misconduct should not receive aid
from the court." Another theory views marriage as a mutually dependent
covenant, and if both parties have breached any of the covenants, neither
may be granted a divorce.12 A third explanation is based on the doctrine
of pari delicto, or equal fault, which also calls for denial of a divorce. 13
The sociological justifications for recrimination have been under con-
stant attack by legal writers.' 4 It was formerly thought that a principal
merit of the doctrine would be that of keeping the family together. How-
ever, almost all the states, although having a vital interest in preservation
'Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 151 Misc. 198, 270 N.Y.Supp. 47 (1934).
5,,if any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her, and give occasions of
speech against her, and bring up an evil name upon her. . ."I and these charges of
the wife against the husband are true, then "she shall be his wife; he may not put
her away all his days." Deut. 22:13-19.
'Beamer, Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. CITY L. REV.
213, 249 (1941).
7Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 147, 161 Eng. Rep. 504, 506 (1790).
120 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
'See 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57 (1937).
"Thirty-two states have some form of recormination by statute, and the remainder,
except Connecticut, recognize the doctrine by juidicial decision. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS § 78, at 82-88 (1932 ed.).
"See, e.g., Thorem v. Thorem, 188 Minn. 153, 246 N.W. 674 (1933) ; Phillips v. Phillips,
48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933).
"Comfort v. Comfort, 17 Cal. 2d 736, 752, 112 P.2d 259, 268 (1941). "The deceptive
analogy to contract law ignores the basic fact that marriage is a good deal more
than a contract." DeBurgh, supra note 3, 250 P.2d at 601.
"Johns v. Johns, 29 Ga. 718 (1860).
"In 1948, a committee of experts of the American Bar Association, participating in
the National Conference of Family Life, strongly recommended the elimination of the
defense of recrimination. REPORT OF THE LEGAL SECTION OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
FAMILY LIFE 1, 3, 7 (1948).
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of the family as the fundamental sociological unit of our civilization, have
decided that the interests of family and society can best be served by per-
mitting divorce in certain situations. 5 Moreover, the trend is towards
further liberalization of divorce laws:
This decision and tendency may be said to be due to a slowly
awakening realization that denial of divorce seldom restores life
to families sociologically dead when they come into court, and
that if anything is preserved it is but the dead and empty shell
of what has been and is no longer--a realization that upon
refusal of divorce, those things which cannot be done legally are
often done illegally, those which cannot be done openly are done
clandestinely; that other relationships are formed, nameless
children born; and that even if the parties force themselves to re-
main together, their children probably will not thank them for it
or even be imbued with any high and lasting ideas about their
family, or the family as a sociological concept. If this is the jus-
tification for permitting divorce where only one party is at fault,
how much more reasonable is it to permit divorce where both
parties hold their marriage vows in contempt, and the likelihood
that attempts at reconciliation will fail are thereby doubled.' 6
Application of recrimination may have the effect of encouraging
immorality. In a majority of cases, the counter charge is based on
adultery or cruelty. 17 It is true that existence of the doctrine causes the
spouse seeking divorce to avoid giving the other a cause of divorce; how-
ever, once both parties have a cause of divorce, either or both may con-
tinue to violate the marriage vows without fear that the other will obtain
a divorce.
As a result, the more honest and upright of the two, who realizes
that his marriage has been a failure and desires to terminate it
and remarry, is denied a divorce and forced to choose between
celibacy and forming an illicit relationship. A legal doctrine
which has this effect can hardly be justified on the basis of
public policy.'
Another major defect of the doctrine is that a petty form of blackmail is
encouraged. The defendant may demand substantial concession is return
for not raising an existing recriminatory defense. 19
The justification that recrimination protects the wife's property in-
terests is based on canon law and early English decisions. In those times
absolute divorce was prohibited because the wife had no property of her
'Public policy of the state still favors maintenance of the marriage if there is a
possibility of reconcilitation. See 4 ARiz. L. REV. 88, 92 (1962).
"
6Beamer, supra note 6, at 249.
7Id. at 251.
1Id. at 252.
'
9DeBurgh, supra note 3, 250 P.2d at 604.
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own and there was no place for women outside the home. The only way
to keep a wife from becoming a public charge was to deny divorce and
continue the husband's liability for her debts. Today women frequently
own property during marriage, and in addition there is a place for them
in society. They now occupy substantial positions in business, industry,
and the professions. 20 Therefore the economic argument in support of
recrimination is no longer valid.
The development of new grounds for divorce not based on fault
has contributed to a trend away from strict recrimination. As a counter-
charge of misconduct against the party seeking divorce, recrimination
was derived from the alleged fault of the parties. It follows, that if a
divorce is sought on some ground other than fault, recrimination would
not be appropriate. If the defendant's fault is not the basis of the action,
there is no reason to require plaintiff to be "innocent." Thus the recent
growth of statutory grounds for divorce, such as separation, incompati-
bility, and insanity, which are based on "conditions" other than fault of
the parties, is another means by which amelioration of the doctrine has
occurred.
21
THE RETREAT FROM RECRIMINATION
The retreat from inflexible operation of the doctrine of recrimination
has taken several, nonmutually exclusive forms: (1) making recrimina-
tion a discretionary rather than an automatic defense,2 2 (2) the use of
comparative rectitude, by which some courts grant a divorce if one party's
misconduct is not as serious as that of the other,23 and (3) double divorce.
The majority of courts abandoning strict recrimination have adopted com-
parative rectitude, while a few, such as Montana and California, have
adopted the double divorce.2
4
1. DISCRETIONARY RECRIMINATION.
By the instant decision Montana has made application of recrimina-
tion discretionary, following the reasoning of the California Supreme
Court in the leading case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,25 decided in 1952.
There, Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, interpreted California's
Civil Code so as to give discretion to trial courts in applying recrimina-
tion. One section of the code states that "divorces must be denied upon
showing [of] . . .recrimination. '26 Another section defines recrimination
2 Beamer, supra note 6, at 253.
'See Comment, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 320, 322 (1953).
'Courts have also restricted the application of recrimination, some requiring that
plaintiff's transgressions be of the same type upon which he bases his action, while
others permit use of the doctrine only when plaintiff is guilty of adultery. Kovak
v. Kovak, 26 Ill. App. 2d 29, 167 N.E.2d 281 (1960); Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wash.
2d 593, 203 P.2d 357 (1949).
'E.g., Longinotti v. Longinotti, 169 Ark. 1001, 277 S.W. 41 (1925).
I'Supra note 3.
'Supra note 3.
2'CAL. CIV. CODE § 111. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 21-118 is identical. Here-
inafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.
1965]
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as "a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against plain-
tiff, in bar of plaintiff's cause of divorce." 27 (Emphasis added.) The lat-
ter section had previously been interpreted as making every cause of
divorce against plaintiff an absolute and automatic bar to relief in every
case. Upon re-examination, however, the California court found, that if
the legislators had intended the statute to be mandatory, then the phrase
"in bar of plaintiff's cause of divorce" would be superfluous. 28 Its inser-
tion, the court said, indicated a legislative intent that a showing of a
cause of divorce against plaintiff would not in every case be "in bar" of
plaintiff's relief, but only in the discretion of the trial court.
In DeBurgh, the California court laid down four major considerations
which should govern the courts in exercising their newly found discretion:
(1) prospect of reconciliation, (2) effect of marital conflict on the par-
ties, (3) effect on third parties, and (4) comparative guilt.29 The court,
however, set no standards to determine what would constitute an abuse of
discretion in application of the new theory of recrimination. This vague-
ness was clarified the following year in Phillips v. Phillips30 when the
same court held that it is an abuse of discretion to apply recrimination
and deny the divorce where the legitimate objects of marriage have been
destroyed. 31 In the principal case, the Montana court applies the Phillips'
rule.3 2
In the thirteen years since the DeBurgh decision, at least fifteen other
jurisdictions have tempered the doctrine of absolute recrimination. 33
The majority of these are western states. Several, like Montana, have
statutes similar to those of California. A definite trend away from strict
recrimination is now recognized. 34 Those states retreating from the doc-
trine have taken two different approaches to making application of re-
crimination discretionary: (1) the use of comparative rectitude as a basis
for granting an unilateral decree in favor of the more "innocent" spouse,
and (2) the use of the dual decree, either automatically with comparative
guilt playing no part, or only when in terms of comparative guilt, both
parties have contributed equally to the marriage failure.
2. COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE.
The doctrine of comparative rectitude has developed by implication
from the pari delicto rationale of strict recrimination. If the parties are
2CAL. CIV. CODE § 122. Identical to R.C.M. 1947, § 21-128.
'8Concurring in result only, three Justices argued that the language of code section 111
precluded any discretion. Associate Justice John C. Harrison, dissenting in the
principal case, argued along the same line. Justice Adair reserved the right to file
a dissent at a later date.
9DeBurgh, supra note 3, 250 P.2d at 606.
341 Cal. 2d 869, 264 P.2d 926 (1953).
'"Id. at 931.
nInstant decision at 644-45.
'An annotation found in 170 A.L.R. 1076 (1947) indicated the beginning of a trend
away from strict recrimination. Numerous decisions which temper recrimination are
found in the supplemental decisions to the annotation.
34CALIu. L. Rzv., supra note 21, at 321.
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denied a divorce because of recrimination when both arc equally at fault,
it follows that if the parties are not in equal fault, that the party least
guilty may be granted a divorce. 35 Comparative rectitude is used in those
states which have relaxed recrimination, yet have not made double divorce
a part of their law. Thus, comparative rectitude may be applied when
the court feels a divorce should be granted because there is no prospect
of reconciliation. 6 The use of the doctrine to grant an unilateral decree
has the advantage of giving the court the power to gra)nt either party a
divorce, depending upon whose conduct has been the most condemnatory.
However, a unilateral decree makes one party the victor, and the other
suffers a psychological, and possibly an economic defeat. The fault prin-
ciple thus continues to be the determining factor.
3. DOUBLE DIVORCE
The award of a divorce to both parties is a recent development of
divorce law, based on the discretion inherent in the clean hands doctrine37
and fostered by the retreat from absolute recrimination. In this country
precedent for the dual decree is found in decisions from the state of Wash-
ington which is the only jurisdiction having mutual divorce by statute.38
However, mutual divorces had been decreed prior to enactment of the
present statute.3 9 Support for the double divorce is also found in the
English case of Blunt v. Blunt,40 which by dictum reasoned that an award
of divorce to both parties was possible when injustice might be done if the
court gave an unilateral decree. 41
Comparative guilt may be a factor in determining whether a double
divorce is justified. Consideration of this factor has resulted in two dif-
ferent approaches in application of the dual decree. In Washington, if
both parties seek a divorce, the courts seem to automatically grant a
decree to both.42 Thus, comparative rectitude is not considered. However,
'Smith v. Smith, 64 Iowa 682, 21 N.W. 137 (1884).
'SIn a comparative rectitude jurisdiction, if fault is exactly balanced, evidently the
divorce is denied. See Furlong, Dual Divorce Decrees and Conciliation in Contem-
porary Family Law, 2 WILLAMETTE L. J. 134, 155 (1963).
'7"Important developments of the past-several decades have made it increasingly clear
that the courts can no longer decline to exercise the discretion inherent in the clean
hands doctrine." DeBurgh, supra note 3, 250 P.2d at 603.
"'If the court determines that either party, or both, is entitled to a divorce .
WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1951).
'Schirmer v. Schirmer, 84 Wash. 1, 145 Pac. 981 (1915); Hilleware v. Hilleware, 92
Wash. 99, 158 Pac. 999 (1916);; McDonall v. McDonall, 95 Wash. 553, 164 Pac. 204
(1917).
"[1943] A.C. 517, 531 (H.L.).
"Although there are no statutory prohibitions against such a decree, the dual divorce
did not appear until 1915. Disapproval by way of dictum was given by Justice Field
in Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 256 (1858), "a decree granting a divorce in favor
of each, would be an anomalous proceeding." Justice Field thought that the first
decree would dissolve the marriage, leaving nothing upon which the second could
operate.
42See, e.g., Schilling v. Schilling, 42 Wash. 2d 105, 253 P.2d 952 (1953); Merkel v.
Merkel, 39 Wash. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951); Hathaway v. Hathaway, 23 Wash. 2d
237, 160 P.2d 632 (1945); Cornwall v. Cornwall, 13 Wash. 2d 594, 126 P.2d 52 (1942);
Kirsch v. Kirsch, 192 Wash. 156, 73 P.2d 356 (1937).
1965]
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in Washington, alimony and support do not depend on which spouse
prevails.43 The English courts exercise more discretion in considering the
three alternatives-denial of divorce, a unilateral decree, or divorce to
both. A dual decree is awarded only when comparative guilt is balanced.
The DeBurgh decision tends towards the English approach in that the
California court indicated that comparative guilt may bear on whether a
unilateral decree or double divorce should be awarded.
44
Certain benefits result from judicious use of the double divorce: (1)
the antagonisms resulting from the attempts of the spouses to prove the
other at fault will be reduced,45 and the victory-reward defeat-sanction
characteristics of the divorce will be eliminated,46 (2) the dual divorce
leads towards abolition of adversary type divorce proceedings which are
not always effective in handling marital difficulties,47 and (3) the double
divorce places both parties on an equal footing regarding alimony and
support orders, and in some states may facilitate property settlements.
Montana has no provision in its statutes for the division of property upon
divorce, but in California and other states having community property
laws, the dual divorce removes the superior tactical position held by the
prevailing party of the unilateral decree. 48
The use of double divorce in Montana should result in less emphasis
being placed on fault, although it may continue to be one of several
factors considered. Also, the mutual decree will give the courts more
latitude in determining support and alimony. R. C. M. 1947, section
21-13949 provides that when a divorce is granted to the wife, the court
may compel the husband to provide for the wife and children.50 But,
if the husband obtains the divorce, Montana courts have held that he
cannot be forced to pay alimony and support. 51 However, the instant case
indicates that when both obtain a divorce, the court may in its discretion
order alimony for the wife although a divorce was granted against her.
Several jurisdictions with similar statutes have so held.5 2 This will help
"The court considers the respective merits of the parties, and the circumstances in
which divorce will leave them. Nerland v. Nerland, 173 Wash. 311, 23 P.2d 24 (1933).
"250 P.2d at 606.
"The alienation of children will be prevented, for no longer will the prevailing spouse
be able to point out the other as being adjudged by court of being cruel or inhuman.
"6For an extensive discussion of the elimination of fault as a basis for divorce, see
Rutman, Departure from Fault, 1 J. FAMILY L. 181, 182 (1961).
"7Moreover, the parties themselves probably prefer this type of decree. Furlong, supra
note 36, at 162-3.
"'It should be noted that many other states are not restricted in considering alimony
and support by which party was successful. These jurisdictions consider thhe circum-
stances and the nature of each spouse's misconduct and are not bound by principles
of fault. Annot., 34 A.L.R. 313, 330 (1954).
"DR.C.M. 1947, § 21-139, "Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband,
the court may compel him to provide for the maintenance of the children of the
marriage and to make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support . .. ."
'The husband may also be compelled to support the wife although she is unsuccessful
in seeking a divorce. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-136, which is, in effect, a partial or limited
divorce.
"Bisehoff v. Bischoff, 70 Mont. 503, 226 Pac. 508 (1924); Damm v. Damm, 82 Mont.
239, 266 Pac. 410 (1928).
52DeBurgh, supra note 3; Burch v. Burch, supra note 3.
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eliminate the harshness and inflexibility which previously existed when
only unilateral decrees were granted, or denied upon showing of recrim-
ination. 53
DOUBLE DIVORCE IN MONTANA
Although the Montana court has adopted double divorce, it is un-
certain whether the court has also approved comparative rectitude. The
court cites with approval decisions of other states which have adopted
both the dual divorce and comparative rectitude, yet rejects the latter in
the principal case, apparently looking to the economic situation of the
parties:
[I]f the doctrine of comparative rectitude is resorted to . . . a
unilateral decree in the lower court . . . would render that court
without jurisdiction to make an equitable settlement with regard
to alimony, thus leaving appellant at large in the community
without means of support. In the case at bar, the lower court
might very well have found, and this seems likely, in view of the
evidence, that the appellant's conduct had been the more con-
demnatory, denied her relief, granted a divorce to respondent
only and thus precluded the payment of alimony in any amount
to appellant. .... 54
Thus the refusal to use comparative rectitude may be unique to the
facts of this case; in another case the court might apply the doctrine to a
factual situation where neither recrimination nor double divorce was
justified. Or, the court may find desirable the increased discretion as to
alimony and support, which is a characteristic of double divorce, and
continue to grant the dual decree in every instance in which both
spouses seek divorce and the marriage is hopelessly destroyed.
It is submitted that the better approach is that taken by the Montana
Supreme Court in the principal case. The retention of the fault principle
and the limitations regarding alimony and support orders inherent in
the doctrine of comparative rectitude make it the less desirable form of
discretionary recrimination. In addition, the award of double decrees
should sharply reduce the number of uncontested divorces, since the ap-
pearance of both parties will no longer jeopardize the decree. Also, the
placing of all marital differences before the court will allow settlement
negotiations to be properly supervised and unfair advantages prevented.
A liberal policy with respect to awarding double divorces would be a
major step in the elimination of fault as the basis of divorce. 55 The en-
larged discretionary powers should be welcomed by Montana courts
operating within the framework of current statutes.
53A Tennessee court held that double divorce destroys any inference or presumption as
to fault. Barber v. Barber, supra note 3.
5'Instant case at 645-46.
'
5 See Rutman, supra note 44.
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In conclusion, the Montana Supreme Court is to be commended for
tempering the erroneous, invalid, and outmoded doctrine of strict recrim-
ination. Although several years of judicial growing pains will be neces-
sary before the double divorce becomes settled law and before the limits
of the trial courts' discretion are fully determined, its adoption marks a
turning point in the resolution of several defects in contemporary divorce
law. By the instant decision, the Montana court has formally recognized
that most marital discord is bilateral in origin.56 In doing away with
the myth of the innocent spouse, Montana's approach to discretionary re-
crimination will permit dissolution of marriages which have totally and
irremediably broken down.
GARY L. DAVIS.
"Furlong, supra note 36, at 169.
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